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PARENTAL CONSORTIUM: ASSESSING
THE CONTOURS OF THE NEW TORT IN
TOWN
Johnny Parker*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Historical Development of Consortium
"The genius of the common law is its ability to adapt itself
to the changing needs of society."' An excellent example of
this genius is the cause of action sounding in loss of parental
consortium.2 The action for loss of parental consortium is a
recent development having its genesis in the tort of loss of
consortium. Loss of consortium seeks to protect the interest
each spouse has in the marital relationship.3 At early common
. Associate Professor of Law, Tulsa University Law School. B.A., University of
Mississippi, 1982; J.D., University of Mississippi Law School, 1984; LL.M., Colum-
bia University Law School, 1987.
Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., 150 N.W.2d 137, 141 (Wis. 1967).
2 Parental consortium is defined as the love, care, companionship and guid-
ance given by a parent to a child. Williams v. Hook, 804 P.2d 1131, 1132 n.1
(Okla. 1990); Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co., 691 P.2d 190, 191 (Wash. 1984); cf.
TEXAS PATrERN JURY CHARGES 7.11A (2d ed. 1987) (defining "parental consor-
tium" as "positive benefits flowing from parents' love, affection, protection, emo-
tional support, services, companionship, care and society"). Texas' use of the word
"services" seemingly causes its definition of parental consortium to be broader
than that followed in Washington and Oklahoma. However, the word "services"
does not broaden the elements of damages recoverable in a parental consortium
claim because "services" has been construed to mean only a non-pecuniary loss.
Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 464 (Tex. 1990); see infra note 143 and ac-
companying text.
' Loss of consortium is a separate and independent action that compensates
one spouse for a negligent injury to the other. An all encompassing definition of
loss of consortium does not exist. The term consortium, at early common law was
used to describe the husband's right to his wife's assistance, services, society,
companionship and sexual relations. See infra notes 4, 14.
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law, the action for consortium protected only the economic
interest that a husband had in his wife and children.4 Con-
Today, consortium is no longer limited to injured spouses. It has come to
represent losses suffered as a result of the injury or death of any family
member. Nor is consortium concerned with simple loss of services; in es-
sence, the lowest common denominator of the interest protected by the
consortium claim is that of "lost society and companionship."
Michael A. Mogill, And Justice for Some: Assessing the Need to Recognize the
Child's Action for Loss of Parental Consortium, 24 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1321, 1324
(1992).
It is uniformly agreed that impairment of any "material" or "sentimental"
aspects of the marital relation is compensable. Material aspects are viewed as
economically quantifiable losses, while sentimental aspects correspond to those
losses not susceptible to exact market valuation. Susan G. Ridgeway, Comment,
Loss of Consortium and Loss of Services Actions: A Legacy of Separate Spheres,
50 MONT. L. REV. 349, 350 (1989). The notion that loss of consortium is con-
cerned with material and sentimental losses is often obscured by jury instructions
which state that the complaining spouse is entitled to recover damages for loss of
the other's "society, companionship, affection, sexual relation and services." Fur-
ther confusion arises from the use of the word "services" which is defined in a
number of jurisdictions to include both the sentimental and material aspects of
the action. "Regardless of how [jurisdictions] characterize consortium, all courts
evaluate the same factors as proof of impairment of consortium." Id. at 351. See
generally Evans Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, 22 MICH.
L. REV. 1 (1923) (containing historical account of consortium); Jacob Lippman,
The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 651 (1930) (same).
In Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. 1978), the Texas Supreme
Court stated that:
The phrase loss of consortium is more accurately described as an ele-
ment of damage rather than a cause of action. But courts have so fre-
quently used the phrase to denote those actions in which loss of consor-
tium is the major element of damage that loss of consortium has come
to be referred to as a cause of action.
Whittlesey, 572 S.W.2d at 666 n.1.
' In Lynch v. Knight, 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (Ex. Ch. 1861), Lord
Wensleydale, writing for the court, observed that "[t]he loss of such service of the
wife, the husband, who alone has all the property of the married parties, may
repair by hiring another servant; but the wife sustains only the loss of the com-
fort of her husband's society and affectionate attention, which the law cannot
estimate or remedy." This passage was construed in America to mean that the
action for loss of consortium encompassed only damages for services, which be-
longed exclusively to the husband, and not the intangible elements of harm to
society and affectionate attention. See infra notes 14, 15.
Prior to the Married Women's Property Act, women were considered as one
with their husbands. Women had no status to sue on their own behalf for wrongs
done against them. The husband, however, had standing to sue for the damages
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sequently, the wife had no standing to sue when her husband
or child was negligently injured.5 Despite obvious changes in
the social, economic and legal status of women, the action for
lost consortium retained most of its common law attributes
until 1950.6
In that year, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, in Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.,' became the
first federal tribunal to unequivocally recognize a wife's right
to assert an action for lost consortium. In Hitaffer, the
plaintiffs husband was negligently injured while in the em-
ployment of the defendant.8 The court, operating in a legal
environment that had totally rejected the notion that a wife
could sue for consortium, analyzed precedents from around the
country and found the notion wanting in logic. The primary
arguments against such an action were that: (1) the wife has
no right as such to the husband's services, although the hus-
band has always had a legal right to the wife's services; (2)
the Emancipation Act gave the wife a right to the fruits of her
own services and consequently, placed the husband in the
and could join his wife in the action. WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 428-30 (1926); see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 125, at 931 (5th ed. 1984). See generally 0. Kahn-Freund, Inconsisten-
cies and Injustices in the Law of Husband and Wife, 15 MOD. L. REV. 133 (1952).
5 HOMER H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES §§ 11.2-.3, at 385, 391 (2d ed. 1988).
' The early common law formulation of loss of consortium was borrowed from
the much earlier Roman theory that the patriarch governed the household. Early
English jurists applied this family law theory first to master-servant relationships
to enable masters to recover for injury to servants. The theory was subsequently
applied to familial relations to protect the husband's interest in the services of
his wife and children. Recovery was subsequently extended to include damages to
society, fellowship and affectionate relations. KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 931;
see also Ridgeway, supra note 3, at 349.
7 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950), overruled on
other grounds by Smitherand Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1957). The
Hitaffer court was not the first to actually recognize a wife's right to recover for
loss of consortium. The Supreme Court of North Carolina had allowed a wife to
recover for loss of her husband's consortium in Hipp v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours
& Co., 108 S.E. 318 (N.C. 1921). Most jurisdictions which previously refused to
recognize the wife's action adopted the Hitaffer opinion.
s Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 812.
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same position as the wife so that neither may bring an action
for consortium; (3) in negligence actions the purpose of damag-
es is to compensate the injured person for the direct conse-
quences of the wrong (the injury to the wife is indirect and
thus not compensable); (4) a wife's injury is too remote and
inconsequential to be measured; (5) the common law recog-
nized no cause of action for the sentimental elements of con-
sortium; (6) the action for consortium has never been allowed
where there was not some showing of loss of services and a
wife is unable to show such a loss; (7) double recovery of dam-
ages would result; and (8) the number of law suits would in-
crease significantly.9 The court, rather than engaging in legal
gymnastics used in previous cases, relied heavily on the mari-
tal relationship to justify the wife's right of action. Judge
Clark, writing for the majority, observed that:
The actual injury to the wife from loss of consortium, which is
the basis of the action, is the same as the actual injury to the
husband from that cause. His right to the conjugal society of
his wife is no greater than her right to the conjugal society of
her husband. Marriage gives each the same rights in that
regard. Each is entitled to the comfort, companionship and
affection of the other. The rights of the one and the obliga-
tions of the other spring from the marriage contract, are mu-
tual in character, and attach to the husband as husband and
wife as wife. Any interference with these rights, whether of the
husband or of the wife, is a violation, not only of a natural
right, but also of a legal right arising out of the marriage
relation .... As the wrongs of the wife are the same in princi-
ple, and are caused by acts of the same nature, as those of the
husband, the remedy should be the same."
The holding in Hitaffer was initially rejected by a number
of other courts. However, uniform condemnation of the old
common law rule by legal scholars and commentators assisted
in increasing the acceptance of the Hitaffer court's conclu-
9 Id. at 813-15.
"0 Id. at 816 (alteration in original) (quoting Bennett v. Bennett, 23 N.E. 17,
18-19 (N.Y. 1889)).
[Vol. 64
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sion." By 1958, the trend of recognition had begun. Today, the
vast majority of jurisdictions allow loss of consortium actions to
be instituted by either spouse. 2 Six jurisdictions have
achieved equality between the spouses by abolishing consor-
tium actions altogether."
The development of the law in regard to interferences with
the parent-child relationship parallels the development of ac-
tions for interference with the spousal relationship. Early com-
mon law recognized only the right of the father to recover dam-
ages for loss of his child's services. This right, like its spousal
counterpart, was based upon the master-servant theory which
entitled the father to compensation for the loss of the child's
services. 4 The master-servant theory is still reflected in loss
of consortium actions. Thus, where a parent seeks recovery for
injury to his child, the law uniformly permits recovery for the
loss of the child's fictional services or earnings."
" Law review articles and legal comments almost unanimously favored recov-
ery by the wife. See, e.g., 1 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW
OF TORTS § 8.9 (1956); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
119 (3d ed. 1964); G.H.L. Fridman, Consortium as an 'Interest" in the Law of
Torts, 32 CAN. B. REv. 1065, 1073-80 (1954); Holbrook, supra note 3; Joseph J.
Simeone, The Wife's Action for Loss of Consortium-Progress or No?, 4 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 424, 431-41 (1957).
12 The wife's right to recover for loss of consortium is recognized in 44 states
and the District of Columbia. For a list of states recognizing the wife's right, see
Mogill, supra note 3, at 1333 n.68.
'1 For a list of the six jurisdictions that deny this action see Mogill, supra
note 3, at 1334 n.69.
14 G.A. Owens, Interference with Trade: The Illegitimate Offspring of an Ille-
gitimate Tort?, 3 MONASH U. L. REV. 41, 45 (1976). In Guy v. Livesey, 79 Eng.
Rep. 428 (KB. 1619), a court, for the first time, observed the analogy between
husband and wife and master and servant. In that case the plaintiff sued the
defendant for the battery of himself and for the battery of his wife, who had
went with the defendant and lived in a "suspicious manner." Guy, 79 Eng. Rep.
at 428. The court held that the plaintiff did not have an action for battery to his
wife. However, the court observed
that the action was well brought; for the action is not brought in respect
of the harm done to the wife, but is brought for the particular loss of
the husband, for that he lost the company of his wife, . . . for which he
shall have this action, as the master shall have for the loss of his
servant's service.
Id. (emphasis added); see also supra note 4; infra note 15.
The theory of loss of services was first endorsed by American courts around
MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 64
By 1970, consortium began to take on a different gloss.
Society began asking courts whether consortium actions should
be expanded to protect parental interest in a child's society and
companionship. Initially, courts, in the absence of statutory
law, 6 were most reluctant to reevaluate the principles under-
lying the law of consortium to allow either parents or children
to recover for the loss of companionship, society, and affection
of their negligently injured loved one.
In 1975, Wisconsin became the first jurisdiction to effectu-
ate a change in its common law to recognize the right of a
parent to recover for loss of an injured child's companionship
and society." In Shockley v. Prier,"s the Wisconsin Supreme
the turn of the century. Loss of services became a technical requirement of an
action for consortium. The loss of services theory is from a practical perspective
obsolete bpcause modern minor children have little, if any, service value or pres-
ent earning capacity. Children today are valued wholly for sentimental reasons,
not for their earnings and labor. Lost service still exists as an acknowledged
fiction of the modern law of lost consortium. "Nevertheless, the 'modern' loss of
services action is no different than the early loss of service action, and the major-
ity of jurisdictions continues to limit the damages a parent may recover to those
for loss of a child's services." Ridgeway, supra note 3, at 363-64; see also Mogill,
supra note 3, at 1328.
Courts throughout the country have muddled the concepts of services, society,
companionship and affection into a mass of confusion. The term "services" has
over time acquired a meaning synonymous with society and companionship. Con-
sequently, the majority view is clearly that loss of society and companionship as
well as services are recoverable where a child has been tortiously injured. See
infra note 24. The confusion is not, however, as great as it may seem because all
courts, regardless of the language used, evaluate the same factors as proof of loss
of consortium.
1 Washington had a statute, and Iowa promulgated a rule of procedure, that
allowed for the recovery of lost companionship and society. See WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 4.24.010 (West 1988); IOwA R. Civ. P. 8; cf Hayward v. Yost, 242 P.2d
971, 977 (Idaho 1952) (construing §§ 5-310 to -311 of Idaho Code to allow parents
to recover for loss of child's society and companionship).
" Several jurisdictions addressed the issue and declined to create a cause of
action for loss of a child's society and companionship prior to 1975. See Smith v.
Richardson, 171 So. 2d 96 (Ala. 1965); Butler v. Chrestman, 264 So. 2d 812
(Miss. 1972); Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp., 215 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1965); Gilbert v.
Santon Brewery, 67 N.E.2d 155 (N.Y. 1946); Kalsow v. Grob, 237 N.W. 848 (N.D.
1931), overruled by Hopkins v. McBane, 427 N.W.2d 85 (N.D. 1988); Quinn v.
City of Pittsburg, 90 A. 353 (Pa. 1914); McGarr v. National & Providence Worsted
Mills, 53 A. 320 (R.I. 1902).
18 225 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1975).
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Court was confronted with the issue of whether the parents of
Paul Shockley, a minor allegedly injured by the negligence of
two physicians, could recover for loss of Paul's aid, comfort, so-
ciety and companionship during the minority of the child.19
Justice Day, writing for the majority, observed that courts
were obligated to make changes in the law "if the common-law
rule no longer fits the social realities of the present day."0
Children, Justice Day noted, rather than being the economic
asset of past decades, were usually sources of great expendi-
tures.21 Consequently, the injury sustained by parents upon
the death or injury of a child is not primarily economic. Rather,
"[s]ociety and companionship between parents and their chil-
dren are closer to our present day family ideal than the right of
the parents to the 'earning capacity during minority,' which
once seemed so important when the common law was originally
established."' As the law currently stands in a majority of
jurisdictions, parents may recover only for additional expenses
incurred in caring for the child and for any loss of the child's
services;' some courts, however, also allow parents to recover
for the tortiously caused loss of a nonfatally injured child's
society, companionship and affection.' Ingenious lawyers, en-
1g Shockley, 225 N.W.2d at 496-97.
2 Id. at 497.
21 Id. at 498.
22 Id. at 499.
23 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child §§ 103-06 (1987); see also Mark L. John-
son, Note, Compensating Parents for the Loss of their Nonfatally Injured Child's
Society; Extending the Notion of Consortium to the Filial Relationship, 1989 U.
ILL. L. REV. 761, 763-64.
2 See, e.g., Frank v. Superior Ct. of Ariz., 722 P.2d 955, 956 (Ariz. 1986);
Yordeo v. Savage, 279 So. 2d 844, 845 (Fla. 1973); Masaki v. General Motors
Corp., 780 P.2d 566, 577 (Haw. 1989); Hayward v. Yost, 242 P.2d 971, 976 (Idaho
1952); Handeland v. Brown, 216 N.W.2d 574, 579 (Iowa 1974); Lee v. USAA Ca-
sualty Ins. Co., 540 So. 2d 1083, 1090 (La. Ct. App. 1989); Davis v. Elizabeth
Gen. Medical Ctr., 548 A.2d 528, 528-30 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988); First
Trust Co. v. Scheels Hardware & Sports, 429 N.W.2d 5, 9-11 (N.D. 1988);
Gallimore v. Children's Hosp. Medical Ctr., 617 N.E.2d 1052, 1053-55 (Ohio 1993);
Jannette v. Duprez, 701 S.W.2d 56, 61 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); Harbeson v. Parke-
Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 492-93 (Wash. 1983); Shockley v. Prier, 225 N.W.2d
495, 499-500 (Wis. 1975). While the Texas court in Jannette v. Duprez recognized
a parent's right to recover for loss of consortium of a nonfatally injured child, the
1994]
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couraged by Hitaffer and Shockley, sought further expansion of
the law of consortium to protect the legal interest of children of
negligently injured parents. Judicial response to expansion was
initially discouraging despite the fact that children possessed
rights and interests commensurate with parents in the familial
relationship. Consequently, in the first wave of cases to address
this issue, courts all over the country uniformly rejected the
notion that a child could recover for loss of companionship,
affection and aid of a negligently injured parent.'
In refusing to allow the action for parental consortium,
courts have found that compensation for the loss or injury to
children was often included in the damages award the
tortfeasor was required to pay the injured parent as a direct
result of the personal invasion. Consequently, there existed a
substantial likelihood of double recovery for the same injury.'
court limited that right of recovery only to instances when the parent actually
witnessed the child's injury. Jannette, 701 S.W.2d at 58.
' See Pleasant v. Washington Sand & Gravel Co., 262 F.2d 471, 473 (D.C.
Cir. 1958); Jeune v. Del E. Webb Constr. Co., 269 P.2d 723, 724 (Ariz. 1954),
overruled by Villareal v. Arizona Dep't of Transp., 774 P.2d 213 (Ariz. 1988);
Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 866 (Cal. 1977); Zorzos v. Rosen,
467 So. 2d 305, 308 (Fla. 1985); Clark v. Suncoast Hosp., Inc., 338 So. 2d 1117,
1119 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Halberg v. Young, 41 Haw. 634, 647 (1957);
Hankins v. Derby, 211 N.W.2d 581, 585-86 (Iowa 1973), overruled by Weitl v.
Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1981); Mueller v. Hellrung Constr. Co., 437 N.E.2d
789, 792 (Ill. 1982); Hoffman v. Dantel, 368 P.2d 57, 59-60 (Kan. 1962); Kelly v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 353 So. 2d 349, 351 (La. Ct. App. 1977);
Durepo v. Fishman, 533 A.2d 264, 265 (Me. 1987); Gaver v. Harrant, 557 A.2d
210, 218 (Md. 1989); Miller v. Monsen, 37 N.W.2d 543, 545-46 (Minn. 1949);
Powell v. American Motors Corp., 834 S.W.2d 184, 191 (Mo. 1992); Guenther v.
Stollberg, 495 N.W.2d 286, 289 (Neb. 1993); General Elec. Co. v. Bush, 498 P.2d
366, 371 (Nev. 1972); Russell v. Salem Transp. Co., 295 A-2d 862, 864 (N.J.
1972); Wilson v. Galt, 668 P.2d 1104, 1112 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 668
P.2d 308 (N.M. 1983); DeAngelis v. Lutheran Medical Ctr., 449 N.E.2d 406, 407
(N.Y. 1983); Vaughn v. Clarkson, 376 S.E.2d 236, 237 (N.C. 1989); Morgel v.
Winger, 290 N.W.2d 266, 267 (N.D. 1980); High v. Howard, 592 N.E.2d 818, 820
(Ohio 1992), overruled by Gallimore v. Children Hosp. Medical Ctr., 617 N.E.2d
1052 (Ohio 1993); Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hosp., 652 P.2d 318,
332-33 (Or. 1982); Steiner v. Bell Tel. Co., 517 A.2d 1348, 1354-55 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1986), affd, 540 A.2d 266 (Pa. 1988); Erhardt v. Havens, Inc., 330 P.2d 1010,
1012 (Wash. 1958), overruled in part by Ueland v. Reynolds Metal Co., 691 P.2d
190 (Wash. 1984).
' See supra note 25; see also Robert J. Cooney & Keven J. Conway, The
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Courts also articulated the difficulty of measuring damages
suffered by a child for loss of such intangibles as love, affection
and attention. Some of these difficulties included: administra-
tive concern for the likelihood of increased litigation; a child's
historical lack of entitlement to his parents' society and servic-
es; and lack of precedence as factors which counsel against
recognition of such a cause of action.27
Continued efforts slowly eroded many of the traditional
arguments relied upon for denial of parental consortium. In
response, many courts launched a final defensive against recog-
nition of the action for parental consortium. Many jurists as-
serted the view that the debate over parental consortium was
one for the legislature to resolve, and, in the absence of a stat-
ute, no action for parental consortium would lie.2 State legis-
latures have all but expressly rejected the judicial invitation to
legislate in this area.29
State legislatures, however, have uniformly recognized the
right of children to recover damages caused by the wrongful
killing of a parent. Wrongful death statutes typically provide
that, in all cases in which the decedent, had he lived, would
have had a cause of action against the tortfeasor, certain
named beneficiaries could sue in their own name and receive
such damages as resulted from the decedent's demise. Damages
which are ordinarily recoverable under wrongful death statutes
include: (1) the pecuniary loss sustained by survivors with
reference to the probable earnings of the decedent in view of
Child's Right to Parental Consortium, 14 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 341, 342-51 (1981);
Mogill, supra note 3, at 1379.
7 See supra note 26; see also Annotation, Child's Action-Loss of Parental
Attention, 11 A.L.R. 4TH 549 (1982); Allan E. Korpela, Annotation, Child's Right
of Action for Loss of Support, Training, Parental Affection, or the Like, Against a
Third Person Negligently Injuring Parent, 69 A.L.R. 3D 528 (1976).
' See, e.g., Gray v. Suggs, 728 S.W.2d 148, 149 (Ark. 1987) (holding that
creation of cause of action was for legislature); Nix v. Preformed Line Prod., 216
Cal. Rptr. 581, 584-85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (declining to recognize cause of ac-
tion); Zorzos v. Rosen, 467 So. 2d 305, 307 (Fla. 1985) (recognizing legislatively
created cause of action for parental consortium). For additional discussion, see
infra note 37.
" See infra note 38 and accompanying text (noting that only two states have
legislatively adopted cause of action).
1994]
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his age, health, livelihood and experience; (2) loss of the
decedent's care, society and attention; and (3) an additional
monetary award deemed fair and just by way of solace and
comfort for the sorrow, suffering and mental anguish caused
his survivor." Several courts have asserted that wrongful
death statutes are manifestations of legislative intent to limit a
child's right to recover for injury to a parent. The utilization of
wrongful death statutes and deference to the legislature as
persuasive evidence against lost consortium, however, are con-
trary to the historical precepts of the common law process. Con-
sequently, undaunted by the lack of judicial response, legal
scholars and practitioners alike continued in the struggle to
gain judicial recognition of the action for parental consor-
tium."1
The first major inroad came in 1980 in the case of Ferriter
v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc.32 Therein, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court became the first tribunal to recognize a com-
mon law action for loss of parental consortium.' Since then, a
significant number of jurisdictions have followed
Massachusetts' lead and recognized the action.' Though legal
30 KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 127, at 951-52.
3" See Roscoe Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MICH.
L. REV. 177, 181 (1916). As early as 1916, Dean Pound criticized the common
law's failure to protect the familial rights of children. Pound observed:
As against the world at large a child has an interest . . . in the society
and affection of the parent, at least while he remains in the household.
But the law has done little to secure these interests. . . . It will have
been observed that legal securing of the interests of children falls far
short of what general considerations would appear to demand.
Id. at 185-86. Dean Prosser also joined in this cause, observing that "[ilt is not
easy to understand and appreciate this reluctance to compensate the child who
has been deprived of the care, companionship and education of his mother, or for
that matter his father, through the defendant's negligence." WILLIAM L. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 125, at 896 (Jesse H. Choper et al. ed.
1971); see also CLARK, supra note 5, § 12.4, at 670-71; Jean C. Love, Tortious
Interference with the Parent-Child Relationship: Loss of an Injured Person's Society
and Companionship, 51 IND. L.J. 590, 595-615 (1976); KEETON ET AL., supra note
4, at 924.
32 413 N.E.2d 690 (Mass. 1980).
Ferriter, 413 N.E.2d at 703.
Several states currently judicially recognize a cause of action for parental
[Vol. 64
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commentaries and periodicals continue to assert that a sub-
stantial number of jurisdictions still deny the action,' this
statement is slightly inaccurate because it does not reflect the
fact that of the thirty-eight jurisdictions which have addressed
the issue, fifteen' recognize the cause of action. Among these
fifteen jurisdictions are six jurisdictions that have reversed
previous positions denying the existence of the tort of loss of
parental consortium. 7 In addition, two state legislatures have
changed the common law of their jurisdictions statutorily,"
consortium. See Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991, 994-97
(Alaska 1987); Villareal v. Arizona Dep't of Transp., 774 P.2d 213, 216-20 (Ariz.
1989); Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259, 261-73 (Iowa 1981), overruled by Audubon-
Exira Ready Mix, Inc. v. Illinois Cent. G.R.R., 335 N.W.2d 148, 151-53 (Iowa
1983); Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424, 425 (Mich. 1981); Keele v. St. Vincent
Hops. & Health Care Ctr., 852 P.2d 574, 576-78 (Mont. 1993); Williams v. Hook,
804 P.2d 1131, 1133-38 (Okla. 1990); Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 465-66
(Tex. 1990); Hay v. Medical Ctr. Hosp., 496 A.2d 939, 946 (Vt. 1985); Ueland v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 691 P.2d 190, 195 (Wash. 1984); Belcher v. Goins, 400
S.E.2d 830, 841 (W. Va. 1990); Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513, 522
(Wis. 1984); Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell County Joint Powers Fire Bd., 797 P.2d
1171, 1176 (Wyo. 1990); see also Reighley v. International Playtex, Inc., 604 F.
Supp. 1078, 1083-84 (D.C. Colo. 1985) (construing Colorado state law). Additional-
ly, two states have statutorily changed their common law positions. See FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 768.0415 (West Supp. 1994); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West
Supp. 1994).
' See, e.g., Ridgeway, supra note 3, at 349; Child's Action-Loss of Parental
Attention, supra note 27, at 552; Korpela, supra note 27, at 530-31. The majority
view provides that lolne who by reason of his tortious conduct is liable to a
parent for illness or other bodily harm is not liable to a minor child for resulting
loss of parental support and care." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 707A
(1977).
' See supra note 34.
17 See supra note 25.
' Section 768.0415 of the Florida Statutes Annotated provides that "[a] person
who, through negligence, causes significant permanent injury to the natural or
adoptive parent of an unmarried dependent resulting in a permanent total disabil-
ity shall be liable to the dependent for damages, including damages for perma-
nent loss of services, comfort, companionship, and society." FLA. STAT. ANN. §
768.0415 (West Supp. 1994); see also United States v. Dempsey, 635 So. 2d 961,
962-65 (Fla. 1994) (construing statute to protect consortium interest of parent in
child and to provide for elements of damage in action brought by parent for inju-
ry to child). Similarly, the Louisiana Civil Code states:
Every act whatever of man that causes damages to another obliges him
by whose fault it happened to repair it. Damages may include loss of
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thus bringing the number of jurisdictions protecting the child's
interest to seventeen of thirty-eight. Furthermore, the vast
majority of jurisdictions that deny the action recognize the
undeniability of the fact that:
It is common knowledge that a parent who suffers serious
physical or mental injury is unable to give his minor children
the parental care, training, love and companionship in the
same degree as he might have but for the injury. Hence, it is
difficult for the court, on the basis of natural justice, to reach
the conclusion that this type of action will not lie. Human
tendencies and sympathies suggest otherwise. Normal home
life for a child consists of complex incidences in which the
sums constitute a nurturing environment. When the vitally
important parent-child relationship is impaired and the child
loses the love, guidance and close companionship of a parent,
the child is deprived of something that is indeed valuable and
precious. No one can seriously contend otherwise.39
Similar sentiments were articulated in California, a juris-
diction which denies the action. The California Supreme Court
in the case of Borer v. American Airlines, Inc.4° observed:
Plaintiffs claim, viewed in the abstract and divorced from its
surroundings, carries both logical and sympathetic ap-
peal .... Certain aspects of [the] spousal relationship are
similar to those of the parent-child relationship, and there
can be little question of the reality of the loss suffered by a
child deprived of the society and care of its parent.4'
consortium, service, and society, and shall be recoverable by the same
respective categories of persons who would have had a cause of action
for wrongful death of an injured person.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West Supp. 1994). Louisiana courts have yet to
construe this statute as giving rise to an action for parental consortium. The
statute certainly suggests by way of implication, however, that a child can bring
an action for loss of consortium.
' See Still v. Baptist Hosp., Inc., 755 S.W.2d 807, 812 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988)
(quoting Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513, 516 (Wis. 1984)); see also,
Susan J.G. Alexander, A Fairer Hand: Why Courts Must Recognize the Value of a
Child's Companionship, 8 COOLEY L. REV. 273, 274-78 (1991).
o 563 P.2d 858 (Cal. 1977).
Borer, 563 P.2d at 862 (quoting Suter v. Leonard, 45 Cal. App. 3d 744, 746
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The law of consortium is firmly entrenched in the common
law. The preceding observations, however, demonstrate that
contemporary courts are slowly coming to grips with the fact
that the original underpinnings of the law of consortium have
all but withered away. Consequently, a substantial likelihood
exists that courts which address this issue in the future will be
influenced by the relational interests of children in a modem
society. The existence of the action for parental consortium can
no longer be questioned. Rather, what remains is for courts to
identify the ideas and policies that will influence the develop-
ment of substantive rules and remedies for violation of this
new substantive right.
B. Policy Considerations
The issue of whether a child has a substantive claim for
the negligent injury of a parent cannot be severed or considered
in isolation from that of which remedy is most appropriate for
the protection of that claim. Remedy is significant because this
concept encompasses the means for achieving or carrying out
the policy envisioned by the recognition of the substantive
right. Courts, as nearly as possible, seek to maintain a careful
and delicate balance between substantive rights and corre-
sponding remedies. Ideally, a remedy should be neither narrow-
er nor broader than the substantive right that invokes it.42
The congruence between rights and remedies is important both
in the selection of a remedy and in its measurements. Thus, it
has been observed:
The idea that remedies and substance must match presents
many of the challenges of remedial law, but the idea is not an
absolute one. It is qualified, sometimes quite substantially, by
the further idea that remedies must be capable of practical
administration and reasonable measurement.... Just as the
remedy is to be selected and measured to carry out the sub-
(1975)).
42 DAN B. DOBBS, REMEDIES: DAMAGEs-EQUiTY-RESTITUTION § 1.2, at 3 (Jesse
H. Choper et al. ed., 1973).
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stantive goals, the substantive rules should be formulated
with the possible remedies in mind."
The remedy most appropriate for interference with a
child's substantive right to parental consortium is damages.
Nevertheless, courts that have refused to recognize the action
have criticized the effectiveness of a monetary award to the
child." The essence of the criticism is best illustrated by the
following, frequently cited passage:
Loss of consortium is an intangible, nonpecuniary loss; mone-
tary compensation will not enable plaintiffs to regain the
companionship and guidance of a mother; it will simply es-
tablish a fund so that upon reaching adulthood, when plain-
tiffs will be less in need of maternal guidance, they will be
unusually wealthy men and women. To say that plaintiff has
been "compensated" for their loss is superficial; in reality they
have suffered a loss for which they can never be compensated;
they have obtained instead, a future benefit essentially unre-
lated to that loss."
The logic underlying this observation is dubious. The practical
counter response is that compensation or monetary damages is
the only manageable way our system of jurisprudence has
found to ease personal loss-pecuniary and nonpecuniary. Fur-
thermore, compensation, especially where a cognizable loss has
occurred, is clearly preferable to denying recovery.
This line of criticism developed and persists because the
policy considerations which underlie loss of parental consor-
tium have never been clearly articulated. As noted earlier, even
courts that refuse to recognize loss of parental consortium ac-
tions appreciate the fact that a genuine injury is inflicted upon
the child as a result of the defendant's negligent conduct.46 It
is no longer doubted that children are persons with legal rights
I d. § 1.2, at 4-5.
Hoesing v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 484 F. Supp. 478, 479 (D. Neb. 1980);
Borer, 563 P.2d at 862.
* Borer, 563 P.2d at 862. For counterargument from jurisdictions recognizing
parental consortium, see infra note 104.
"' See supra notes 39, 41.
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and entitlements. Likewise, it is beyond dispute that minor
children have an interest in the familial relationship that is as
important, if not more so, than that of husband and wife. These
truths, combined with the legal protection common law courts
have historically accorded other familial interests, suggest that
the child's interest in consortium is legitimate.47
Common law courts have traditionally expressed reluc-
tance to recognize a new substantive action only where the
asserted action does not fit precisely within a traditional ana-
lytical framework. For example, where a new substantive right
such as parental consortium is asserted, common law courts,
more frequently than not, look to the underlying theory of
culpability to determine the merits of the assertion. In the
context of parental consortium the underlying theory of culpa-
bility is negligence. Consequently, the initial inquiry is whether
the substantive claim for parental consortium defies traditional
negligence analysis.
The traditional negligence analysis requires proof of duty,
breach, proximate cause and damages. The legal concepts of
duty and proximate cause are, however, most often cited as the
factors limiting the development of new substantive tort claims.
While duty and proximate cause are often treated as distinct
analytical inquiries, such is not always the case.' "[D]uty is
not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total
of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that
the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection."49 The same
policy concerns and considerations which are examined in the
context of whether a duty is owed are more often than not
duplicated in the proximate cause inquiry. The significant dis-
tinction between duty and proximate cause is the role each
concept plays in the analysis of a negligence action. The duty
inquiry is traditionally utilized to determine whether a rela-
41 See Ralph S. Petrilli, A Child's Right to Collect for Parental Consortium
Where Parent is Seriously Injured, 26 J. FAM. L. 317, 319-20, 346-47 (1987-88);
see also Johnson, supra note 23, at 774-75.
4' See KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 42, at 273.
'9 WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 331-34 (3d
ed. 1964).
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tionship exists that imposes upon the defendant a legal obliga-
tion for the benefit of the plaintiff.' Proximate cause, on the
other hand, is concerned with confining the defendant's liability
to a reasonable limit.51
Parental consortium is consistent with the traditional neg-
ligence analysis. It does not strain the concept of proximate
cause to say that a negligent tortfeasor should foresee harm to
children resulting from permanent injury to a parent. This fact
has never been questioned. What then has caused courts
such grave concerns with regards to parental consortium
claims?
Judicial attempts to balance the congruence between rights
and remedies can lead to unexplainable results. Courts that
have entertained the issue and denied recovery have all based
their decisions on administrative and remedial concerns. Such
reasoning is analogous to the brain teaser, "which came first,
the chicken or the egg?" In essence, courts that have denied
recovery have utilized the means (the difficulty of fashioning a
remedy) to defeat the ends (the recognition of a legitimate sub-
stantive interest).
Whether to recognize a new common law substantive claim
has traditionally been determined by ascertaining whether the
complaining person has an interest "entitled to" and "capable
of' legal protection. As discussed above, children are persons
with a legal interest in the familial relationship. That interest
is consistent with traditional negligence analysis. Administra-
tive and remedial concerns should not determine whether a
new common law substantive action should be recognized.
Rather, these concerns should be addressed in and incorporated
into that part of the common law process which concerns itself
with fashioning the prima facie requirements, the measure of
damages, and limitations to recovery. To illustrate, the rule
that a child can assert a parental consortium claim only where
the parent has suffered severe, serious, and permanent injury
acts as a limitation which diminishes both administrative and
50 KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 53, at 356.
1 Id.
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remedial concerns. This rule has been adopted by a substantial
number of the jurisdictions which recognize claims for loss of
parental consortium. This rule also demonstrates that the prop-
er place for administrative and remedial concerns is not in an
inquiry dealing with whether to recognize a new substantive
common law right, but rather in fashioning the prima facie
requirements and other judicial limitations to the action. What
remains, however, is to demonstrate that interference with a
child's interest in parental consortium leads to both real and
significant harm not only to the relationship, but also to the
child.
As noted earlier, the vast majority of jurisdictions which
deny the existence of the substantive right to parental consor-
tium recognize that actual harm results from the negligent
injury of the parent. A close examination of these cases, howev-
er, suggests that the harm referred to is harm to the relation-
ship as contrasted with harm to the child.52 The reality is that
children often suffer mentally and emotionally where there has
been serious and permanent injury to the parent. The harm
done to a child where a parent, due to the negligence of the
defendant, is totally and permanently paralyzed, is probably as
great as where the parent is killed.
The major policy consideration underlying tort law is the
compensation of wrongfully injured persons. The common law
commitment to this policy is strong and is manifested in the
number of exceptions to the traditional tort analysis recognized
by common law courts." Public policy, though articulated by
jurists and legislators, is considered to be the
[clommunity common sense and common conscience, extended
and applied throughout the state to matters of public morals,
health, safety, welfare and the like; it is that general and
well-settled public opinion relating to man's plain, palpable
See supra notes 39, 41 and accompanying text.
Two of the most well known common law exceptions to the traditional neg-
ligence analysis are res ipsa loquitur and the rule of Summers v. Tice. Both de-
veloped out of public policy concerns that many wrongfully injured persons would
go uncompensated if adjustment in the law were not made.
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duty to [mankind], having due regard to all circumstances of
each particular relation and situation. 4
The policy considerations underlying loss of parental consor-
tium are bolstered by the high priority given to the idea of the
traditional family. Though historically male dominated and
biased, the idea of the traditional family has influenced the
development of the vast majority of civic institutions whether
social, political or religious.
Most people who have children hope to enjoy the experi-
ence of raising a child in a normal happy relationship, which
will result in a bond existing throughout their lives. The pros
and cons of parenthood have been the subject of countless arti-
cles and books. The psychological joys derived from this experi-
ence are believed to surpass any other." One renowned psy-
chologist stated that "most Americans think of their families as
the most important things in their lives," and that Americans
derive much of their pleasure from their families.5" For many
Americans who have decided to commit their finances, time
and emotions to parenthood, the loss of the opportunity to
enjoy a normal experience is a devastating blow. Children, who
are the intended and direct beneficiaries of a healthy parenting
experience, are expected to return to the parents the fruits of
their parents' labor when mom and dad are old. Consequently,
if the parenting process is culpably disturbed, the probability of
harm to all is extremely likely.
This article will explore the contours of the cause of action
for parental consortium. It is intended to create awareness and
give direction. Section A examines the issue of who can be a
plaintiff in a loss of parental consortium action. Section B dis-
cusses the nature and quality, both temporary and permanent,
of the injury necessary to support the action. This section also
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1231 (6th ed. 1990).
55 See Louis GENEVIE & EVA MARGOLIES, THE MOTHERHOOD REPORT: How
WOMEN FEEL ABOUT BEING MOTHERS 55-69 (1987).
' Patrick Reardon, Top Threat to Family: No Time For the Kids, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE, Oct. 10, 1989, § 1, at 1 (quoting Dr. Lee Salk, nationally recognized
child and family psychologist).
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examines the derivative nature of loss of consortium and the
effect of an injured parent's contributory negligence on the
child's claim. Section C scrutinizes the various methods of as-
sessing damages in a loss of parental consortium action. This
section concludes that many of the rules for assessing damages
may be borrowed from other substantive areas of the law such
as wrongful death and spousal consortium. Section D attempts
to illustrate the various prima facie case requirements which
have developed in response to the view taken by courts of the
substantive rules articulated in Sections A, B, and C. Finally,
Section E observes that further attempts to expand the law of
consortium to protect filial relationships other than the marital
relationship, are inevitable.
II. PARENTAL CONSORTIUM
A. Plaintiffs
The issue of who can be a plaintiff in a parental consor-
tium action has a standard answer. Because dependent minor
children are the group most likely to suffer real harm due to
the disruption of the parent-child relationship, all jurisdictions
agree that a claim can be asserted on behalf of these parties.57
Several jurisdictions, such as Arizona," Texas,59 Washing-
ton,' and Iowa,"' do not limit the action solely to minor chil-
dren. These jurisdictions, while recognizing that minors are the
group most likely to suffer real and severe injury due to the
disruption of the parent-child relationship, leave the issue of
whether children other than minors have standing to sue to the
jury in fixing damages. 2 In essence, when the plaintiff is an
" See supra note 31; see also ALASKA PATTERN CIVL JURY INSTRUCTION 20.09
cmt. (1990) ("[M]inor children have a cause of action for loss of parental consor-
tium. Whether such a cause of action exists for non-minors is an open question,
although the Hibpshman court referred to case law restricting the cause of action
to minors. . . .") (citations omitted).
Villareal v. State Dep't of Transp., 774 P.2d 213, 220 (Ariz. 1989).
Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Tex. 1990).
Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co., 691 P.2d 190, 195 (Wash. 1984).
61 Audubon-Exira Ready Mix, Inc. v. Illinois Cent. G.R.R., 335 N.W.2d 148,
152 (Iowa 1983).
See, e.g., Reagan, 804 S.W.2d at 466; Ueland, 691 P.2d at 195. The ratio-
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emancipated adult child, the trier of fact can consider the na-
ture of the relationship between the child and injured parent in
determining the award. The standing rule followed in a given
jurisdiction will also affect the measure of damages in parental
consortium actions."
Some, but not all, jurisdictions have concluded that, in
addition to minor children, handicapped"' or incapacitated'
children also qualify as plaintiffs. The further delineation of
"minor children" into distinct groups suggests that courts are
genuinely seeking to protect the essential elements of the par-
ent-child relationship. Those elements are the children's need
for parental care, love, companionship and support. The delin-
eations also have in common the element of dependency. There-
fore, in the vast number of jurisdictions that recognize the
action, any child, other than an adult emancipated child, who
is primarily dependent on the parent for love, care and support,
can be a plaintiff. It is essential that dependency be rooted not
only in the economic needs but also in emotional and psycho-
logical requirements of the child." A minor child who does not
live in the home is not automatically barred from bringing suit
for parental consortium.67 Rather, where the child is not in
the home, the trier of fact must be presented with evidence of
the filial relationship and of needs that are not met due to the
injury to the parent."
Relatives other than children of "adoptive or natural par-
ents"69 are not entitled to assert a claim for parental consor-
nale behind this view is that adult children are allowed to recover under both the
Texas and Washington wrongful death statutes. Reagan, 804 S.W.2d at 466;
Ueland, 691 P.2d at 195.
6' See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Belcher v. Goins, 400 S.E.2d 830, 841 (W. Va. 1990) (dependency
on parent is controlling factor in determining standing).
See, e.g., Williams v. Hook, 804 P.2d 1131, 1138 (Okla. 1990).
Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690, 696 (Mass. 1980).
Barbosa v. Hopper Feeds, Inc., 537 N.E.2d 99, 104 (Mass. 1989).
Barbosa, 537 N.E.2d at 104-05.
In Villareal, the court observed, "A proper plaintiff is a child whose parent
has been injured. We limit our definition of parent to include biological and adop-
tive parents." Villareal v. Arizona Dep't of Transp., 774 P.2d 213, 219 (Ariz.
1989). This definition is consistent with the law of other jurisdictions recognizing
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tium. As Justice Gonzalez observed in Reagan v. Vaughn:70
The distinction between the interests of children and those of
other relatives is rational and easily applied. Most children
are dependent on their parents for emotional sustenance. This
is rarely the case with more remote relatives. Thus, by limit-
ing the plaintiffs in the consortium action to the victim's chil-
dren, the courts would ensure that the losses compensated
would be both real and severe.7
The issue of who can be a plaintiff in a loss of parental
consortium action is initially determined by examining whether
a parent-child relationship exists. Thereafter, dependency,
which encompasses the economic, emotional and psychological
needs of the child, becomes the primary factor in determining
whether the victim's child has a cause of action72 and in calcu-
lating the amount of recovery in that action.73
This analytical framework is useful in determining novel
questions such as whether illegitimate children, step-children,
foster children or fetuses have a right of action for parental
consortium. The logical answer, at least with regard to illegiti-
mate children who are involved in a dependent, filial relation-
ship with the natural parent, should be in the affirmative.
Step-children and foster children, for policy reasons, may
engender recognition of a special exception to this analytical
framework. Such an exception would be analogous to the rule
in Dillon v. Legg,74 which allows a bystander in relational
loss of parental consortium. For a list of jurisdictions recognizing loss of parental
consortium, see supra note 34. "Parent" does not include grandparent, siblings,
other relatives or friends, and may not include a stepparent who has not adopted
the child. 2 JACOB STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES § 13.20, at 178
(2d ed. 1991).
70 804 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. i990).
"' Reagan, 804 S.W.2d at 466 (quoting Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344
N.W.2d 513, 521 (Wis. 1984)). This view is consistent with case law in each ju-
risdiction that recognizes the action.
72 See, e.g, Villareal, 774 P.2d at 220; Belcher v. Goins, 400 S.E.2d 830, 842
(W. Va. 1990).
"' See, e.g., Villareal, 774 P.2d at 220; Reagan, 804 S.W.2d at 467; Ueland v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 691 P.2d 190, 194-95 (Wash. 1984).
74 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
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proximity to the injured person to recover for emotional dis-
tress caused by witnessing the injury.7 5 Dillon disavows the
rule of law, once followed in a substantial majority of jurisdic-
tions, which precluded bystanders from recovering for emotion-
al distress unless they themselves were in the zone of dan-
ger.
76
The Dillon court's rejection of the zone-of-danger rule was
in part due to the overly restrictive effect of the test. By bal-
ancing physical proximity, relational proximity and temporal
proximity, the court devised a standard which not only operat-
ed as a limitation to recovery but also as a guarantor of the
genuineness of claims. This extended legal protection to include
a larger number of genuine claims for emotional distress, which
previously could not have been brought.
Relational proximity is certainly consistent with the policy
considerations underlying loss of parental consortium. The
major attraction of the relational proximity standard is its
flexibility. It does not require the creation of an immutable rule
precluding certain groups of children from asserting a cause of
action. Rather, it embodies the philosophy that a child's stand-
ing to sue for loss of parental consortium should be determined
on a case-by-case basis. This is much more attractive than a
strict rule precluding step-children and foster children from as-
serting an action. Step-children and foster children should not
be denied recovery; especially, where they can prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence the existence of a strong filial rela-
tionship and emotional and financial dependency upon the
injured step or foster parent.
The development of the tort law of fetal protec-
tion-prenatal injury- has been slow and controversial. Prior
to 1946, legal actions seeking compensation for prenatal injury
were uniformly rejected.77 That rejection focused on two rea-
sons: (1) the defendant could owe no duty to a person not in
Dillon, 441 P.2d at 921.
I ld. at 915. This view has been adopted by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 313 (1965).
77 KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 55, at 367-68.
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existence at the time of the injury; and (2) the difficulty of
proving causal relationship was so tenuous that the danger of
fictitious claims was too great.78 Presently, every jurisdiction
recognizes that a child injured inter-utero and born alive can
maintain an action for prenatal injury, and if he dies as a re-
sult of such injuries after birth, an action will lie for wrongful
death. Many jurisdictions, however, have limited the right to
recover to cases where the child is viable or quick at the time
of the injury.79
The rights of fetuses pose a particular problem in the con-
text of loss of parental consortium since the emotional aspect of
the parent-child relationship, which is the essence of a parental
consortium claim, is obviously lacking. It can hardly be said
that a fetus has an emotional attachment to the negligently
injured parent. Likewise, the degree of fetal dependency on the
injured parent for care, society and support is tenuous at best.
B. Nature of the Injury
The action for parental consortium contemplates a single
tortious act which injures the parent and consequently the
child by virtue of their relationship to each other. The injured
parent sustains direct personal injuries for which he or she has
the exclusive right to recover. The child suffers damages to
emotional interests emanating from the parent-child relation-
ship and has the right to bring an action for loss of parental
consortium to recover for these damages.
Not only must there be an injury to a parent, but in a
substantial number of jurisdictions, that injury must be com-
pensable; that is, an injury for which the defendant is liable.'
Accordingly, in Arizona, Montana, Texas, Washington, Wiscon-
sin, West Virginia, and Vermont, the child's consortium claim
is barred as a matter of law when the jury finds for the defen-
dant on the injured parent's personal injury claim."1 If the
78 Id.
79 Id.
's See, e.g., Villareal, 774 P.2d at 220; Reagan, 804 S.W.2d at 467; Ueland,
691 P.2d at 192.
"' See Villareal, 774 P.2d at 220; Keele v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care
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injured parent's contributory negligence bars his or her recov-
ery, it also bars the child's claim for lost parental consor-
tium. 2 The same rule applies under the comparative negli-
gence rule where the injured parent is precluded from recover-
ing because his or her negligence was greater than that of the
defendant.' Likewise, the injured parent's settlement or re-
lease of the action may operate to dislodge the child's action."
The remaining jurisdictions which recognize the action, but
have not expressly ruled on this issue, may or may not follow
the common law as discussed above. These jurisdictions, Alas-
ka, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Oklahoma, and Wyoming,
may choose to follow the spousal consortium rule which prohib-
its reduction of the non-injured spouse's consortium award for
the contributory negligence of the injured spouse." Surpris-
ingly, Iowa and Massachusetts, both jurisdictions which allow
actions for loss of parental consortium, prohibit the reduction of
spousal consortium awards for the contributory negligence of
the injured spouse." It would not be surprising for these
states, along with others, to apply this rule to their common
law of parental consortium. Conversely, Alaska, Oklahoma, and
Wyoming view consortium as derivative and allow spousal
consortium awards to be reduced by the contributory negligence
of the injured spouse."s Our legal system's preoccupation with
Ctr., 852 P.2d 574, 577 (Mont. 1993); Reagan, 804 S.W.2d at 467; Hay v. Medical
Ctr. Hosp., 496 A.2d 939, 942-43 (Vt. 1985); Ueland, 691 P.2d at 192; Belcher,
400 S.E.2d at 841; Theama, 344 N.W.2d at 522.
Villareal, 774 P.2d at 220; Reagan, 804 S.W.2d at 467.
Villareal, 774 P.2d at 220; Reagan, 804 S.W.2d at 467.
See, e.g., Belcher v. Goins, 400 S.E.2d 830, 842 (W. Va. 1990).
M See Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply Inc., 734 P.2d 213, 213 (Alaska
1987); Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259, 259 (Iowa 1981), overruled by Audubon-
Exira Ready Mix Inc. v. Illinois Cent. G.R.R., 335 N.W.2d 148 (Iowa 1983);
Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690, 690 (Mass. 1980); Wil-
liams v. Hook, 804 P.2d 1131, 1131 (Okla. 1990); Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell Coun-
ty Joint Powers Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171, 1171 (Wyo. 1990).
'a See Schwennen v. Abell, 430 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 1988); Handeland v.
Brown, 216 N.W.2d 574, 579 (Iowa 1974); Morgan v. Lalaniere, 493 N.E.2d 206,
212 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986).
87 See Eggert v. Working, 599 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Alaska 1979); McKee v.
Neilson, 444 P.2d 194, 197 (Okla. 1968); Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361, 1369
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uniformity and certainty of law supports the conclusion that
these jurisdictions will probably apply the same rule to paren-
tal consortium claims.
1. Derivative vs. Independent Claims
The different views existing in regard to "compensable
injury" are the consequence of the dual nature of consortium
claims. Consortium claims have historically been viewed as
derivative since they are dependent on the injured spouse or
parent having a valid cause of action. They are also generally
considered to be separate and independent claims. Courts that
view consortium claims as derivative adhere to the rule that
they must stand or fall with the main claim.' As William
Prosser explained:
The conflict that appears to be developing in the cases, how-
ever, suggests the need for basic explanations, of which there
has been something of a shortage. Courts have commonly said
that the consortium action is derivative and must fall with
the main claim, but as they could as well have said that it
was independent, this sounds more like a conclusion than a
reason, and indeed the courts which hold that the injured
person's contributory negligence does not reduce damages in
the consortium claim have said exactly that. But it must also
be observed that the label "independent action" for the consor-
tium claim is equally a conclusion. In the end the reasons for
adopting one line of cases or another may turn less on logic
than on perceptions of social needs and justice to the par-
ties."
The absence of a rational explanation for choosing either
approach over the other suggests that courts have broad discre-
tion in shaping this aspect of consortium. A major criticism of
the derivative approach is its all-or-nothing nature. In states
which still adhere to common law contributory negligence, the
(Wyo. 1986).
88 KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 125, at 938.
'9 Id. § 125, at 938-39.
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child's claim completely terminates along with that of the in-
jured parent. Thus, the tortfeasor receives a windfall and com-
pletely escapes the legal consequences of his tortious conduct.
The abolition of common law contributory negligence and the
adoption by a majority of states of some variant of comparative
fault diminishes the frequency with which a complete forfeiture
of the child's claim will occur. However, adherence to the deriv-
ative view will still cause a diminution in value of the child's
claim. Consequently, the issue should be resolved by taking
into consideration the equity of the matter, especially where
injury of a permanent nature is required to support the child's
claim.
2. Workers' Compensation Laws
Workers' compensation benefits are in the nature of a
compromise by which the worker receives limited compensa-
tion, usually less than that which could have been awarded by
a jury, in return for an extended liability and assurance of
payment from the employer. Ordinarily, when an injury to an
employee occurs in the scope of employment, it is compensable
under the workers' compensation laws. Consequently, courts
uniformly hold that the statutorily prescribed compensation is
the sole remedy and that any common law action against the
employer is barred. When a parent is negligently injured while
acting within the scope of his employment, the issue is whether
the exclusivity provisions of the workers' compensation statutes
operate as a bar to claims for loss of consortium.
Logic would suggest that the derivative/independent claim
dichotomy would be a useful analytical tool in determining
whether exclusivity provisions preclude loss of parental consor-
tium actions against employers where an injured parent is
entitled to receive workers' compensation benefits. However,
this is not the case. Rather, the majority of courts reason that
exclusive remedy provisions, which abolish other civil remedies
for injuries to workers and provide that compensation under
the act is in lieu of other common law rights, evidence legisla-
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tive intent to prohibit common law actions against employ-
ers.
Currently, three jurisdictions, Iowa, Massachusetts and
Washington, view loss of consortium as an independent
claim." Massachusetts recognized that the exclusive remedy
provision of its workers' compensation laws did not bar a child's
action for loss of parental consortium.92 This position, howev-
er, has subsequently been statutorily modified by the Massa-
chusetts Legislature, which amended its laws to bar consortium
claims unless the employee reserved his common law rights at
the time of hire.93 On the other hand, the Washington Su-
preme Court in Provost v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co.'
clearly utilized the statutory interpretation approach to con-
clude that loss of parental consortium actions are barred by the
state's exclusive remedy statute.
3. Permanent vs. Temporary Injury
The tort of loss of parental consortium, unlike spousal
consortium,' is concerned with significant interference with
the parent-child relationship. Some courts, therefore, have gone
to great lengths to define the nature of the injury for which the
action intends to compensate. All jurisdictions which recognize
loss of parental consortium agree that the child has a right of
90 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 66.10-.21
(1993).
"1 See Huber v. Hovey, 501 N.W.2d 53, 57 (Iowa 1993); Eyssi v. City of Law-
rence, 618 N.E.2d 1358, 1363 (Mass. 1993) (quoting Feltch v. General Rental Co.,
412 N.E.2d 67, 70 (Mass. 1981)); Cornejo v. Washington, 788 P.2d 554, 563
(Wash. Ct. App. 1990).
' Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690, 702 (Mass. 1980).
' MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 152, § 24 (West. Supp. 1994); see also Eyssi,
618 N.E.2d at 1361 (discussing amendment and its affect).
696 P.2d 1238, 1240-41 (Wash. 1985).
In a spousal consortium action the injured spouse must have suffered an
injury which deprives the non-injured spouse of some benefit which formerly ex-
isted in the marriage. Consequently, the consortium claim of the non-injured
spouse can be based on non-impact injury to the injured spouse, such as emotion-
al distress suffered by the spouse in a zone of danger situation or the injured
spouse's emotional distress caused by observing their seriously injured child at
the scene of an accident. See STEIN, supra note 69, § 13.13, at 155.
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action when the injured parent has suffered a serious, severe
and permanent physically or mentally disabling injury.' In
jurisdictions where the sole basis for parental consortium is
permanent injury and the extent of the parent's injury is in
dispute, the trier of fact must make a threshold finding that
the injury to the parent satisfies this characterization prior to
resolution of the consortium damages issue.
A number of jurisdictions, including Wyoming,9" Wiscon-
sin,9" Massachusetts' and Michigan"° seemingly allow re-
covery for mere negligent injury to a parent regardless of the
degree or extent of harm. It should be noted, however, that the
seminal cases from these jurisdictions all involved severe and
permanent physical or mental injury to the parent.1" Juris-
dictions which adhere to this rule will probably allow recovery
where there has been temporary as contrasted with permanent
injury to the parent. These jurisdictions treat consortium as a
unitary concept embracing all the familial aspects of the par-
ent-child relationship, so that an interference with any of the
rights, duties or obligations thereof constitutes a basis for an
action for parental consortium.
Temporary injury, as a grounds for a parental consortium
claim, is arguably inconsistent with the traditional negligence
analysis which, unlike intentional tort analysis, requires proof
of actual damages. In essence, compensation for temporary
injury unnecessarily assumes that the child will suffer injury
from every act of negligent harm to the parent, no matter how
slight. There is a substantial likelihood, therefore, that awards
based on temporary injuries violate the prohibition against
awarding uncertain or speculative damages. 2
06 See supra note 34.
See Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell County Joint Powers Fire Bd., 797 P.2d
1171, 1176 (Wyo. 1990).
See Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513, 522 (Wis. 1984).
See Ferriter, 413 N.E.2d at 692-93.
See Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424, 427 (Mich. 1981).
101 See Ferriter, 413 N.E.2d at 691; Berger, 303 N.W.2d at 424; Williams v.
Hook, 804 P.2d 1131, 1131 (Okla. 1990); Theama, 344 N.W.2d at 513; Nulle, 797
P.2d at 1171.
102 Damages which are uncertain, contingent or speculative in nature cannot be
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The severe and permanent injury requirement, on the
other hand, does not assume injury to the parent-child relation-
ship. It combats frivolity and legitimizes the child's allegation
of injury by requiring not only proof of the parental relation-
ship before and after the injury, but also evidence of the extent
of the parent's injury. The severe, serious and permanent inju-
ry rule also furnishes a natural barometer with which to gauge
the inadequacy or excessiveness of the damages award.
C. Assessing Damages Generally
"Damages" has been defined as "a pecuniary compensation
or indemnity, which may be recovered in the courts by any
person who has suffered loss, detriment, or injury whether to
his person, property, or rights, through the unlawful act, omis-
sion or negligence of another.""°3 Damages are given as com-
pensation for injury. The purpose of a damages award is to
place the plaintiff in the same position, as far as money can, as
he would have been in had there been no breach of duty or
injury.' The lack of a standard with which to measure dam-
ages for loss of parental consortium is a recurrent justification
for the refusal by many jurisdictions to recognize the action. In
essence, these courts are concerned that the difficulty in defin-
made the basis of a recovery. Damages may be uncertain, either as to their exis-
tence or their nature, or in respect of the cause from which they result. 25 C.J.S.
Damages § 26 (1966).
103 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 389 (6th ed. 1990). One court has defined dam-
ages as "the word which expresses in dollars and cents the injury sustained by a
plaintiff." Washburn v. Pearson, 226 So. 2d 758, 760 (Miss. 1969) (quoting Fideli-
ty & Casualty Co. v. Huse & Carleton, Inc., 172 N.E. 590, 593 (Mass. 1930)).
" See Lee v. Southern Homes Sites Corp., 429 F,2d 290, 293 (5th Cir. 1970).
One justification for denying the action for parental consortium is that money
cannot fairly compensate the child. Jurisdictions which recognize the action have
typically responded to this argument in the following manner:
Although a monetary award may be a poor substitute for the loss of a
parent's society and companionship, it is the only workable way that our
legal system has found to ease the injured party's tragic loss. We recog-
nize this as a shortcoming of our society, yet we believe that allowing
such an award is clearly preferable to completely denying recovery. ...
Theama, 344 N.W.2d at 520.
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ing and quantifying damages may lead to double recovery. This
justification, however, is without merit. While there are estab-
lished measures of damages for particular situations, the mea-
sure to be used in any given case should depend on the princi-
ples of fairness and the individual facts of the case, including
the pleadings, evidence, theories and arguments selected. The
fact that damages cannot be computed without difficulty or
with demonstrable accuracy is not enough to deny the
plaintiff's cause." Rather, the jury is entrusted with the dif-
ficult task of determining the damage award."°6
Much of the law in regards to parental consortium can be
borrowed from other well established and accepted areas of the
law. For example, the proper standard with which to measure
damages in loss of parental consortium actions is the standard
currently used in cases involving wrongful death actions."°7
Wrongful death statutes uniformly allow children to recover for
the loss of companionship and society of a tortiously killed
parent." s Here, as with other intangible losses such as pain
" The uncertainty of proving damages should not preclude the granting of
relief. As one commentator stated:
Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the ascertain-
ment of the amount of damages with certainty, it would be a perversion
of fundamental principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured per-
son, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from making any amend for his
acts.
CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 27 (1935).
" See, e.g., Beagle v. Vasold, 417 P.2d 673, 675 (Cal. 1966) ("[T]he jury is
asked to evaluate in terms of money a detriment for which monetary compensa-
tion cannot be ascertained with any demonstrable accuracy."); Alamo Rent-A-Car,
Inc. v. Clay, 586 So. 2d 394, 395 (Fla. 1991) (examining Florida's wrongful death
statute and observing that monetary value of intangible losses to child of his
father's companionship and parental influence is compensation which may be
properly assessed only by jury).
o Both parental consortium and wrongful death actions are concerned with
providing recovery for intangible losses. While wrongful death actions did not
exist at common law, they have been statutorily recognized in every jurisdiction.
Furthermore, courts have utilized common law precepts to fill in the gaps left by
legislatures. Dobbs, supra note 42, § 8.2. Borrowing from the law of wrongful
death also assures uniformity and certainty in the law and its application.
108 See KEETON, ET AL., supra note 4, § 127, at 952-53; Petrilli, supra note 47,
at 328. Twenty-five jurisdictions allow recovery for loss of consortium through
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and suffering, the issue may be resolved by the impartial con-
science and judgment of the jurors who are expected to act
reasonably and intelligently in light of the evidence present-
ed.l o09
A basic premise of the law of compensation is that a plain-
tiff can receive only one satisfaction for damages arising out of
the same facts.11 Consequently, the different methods of as-
certaining damages in a particular situation should not be
applied in such a manner as to give double compensation for
the same injury. The prohibition against double recovery grew
out of the rule that the law should not permit a person to real-
ize a profit or put him in a better position than he would have
been in had there been no injury.' The concern that the
plaintiff will receive double recovery because the child and
parent will receive compensation for the same injuries is a
legitimate one. Nevertheless, this concern can be alleviated
with the use of the procedural devices of joinder of actions,
appropriate jury instructions and special verdicts.1
1. Joinder
A joinder requirement is essential to the continued vitality
of parental consortium. A mandatory joinder rule alleviates the
majority of concerns articulated as grounds for denying the ac-
tion.1 Mandatory joinder negates the possibility of a multi-
wrongful death statutes, while an additional fourteen jurisdictions allow similar
recovery under statutes containing language that initially had been construed as
limiting recovery to pecuniary loss. For a list of cases and citations, see Mogili,
supra note 3, at 1331 nn.79-81.
109 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
1o DOBBS, supra note 42, § 1.5.
. 25 C.J.S. Damages § 3 (1966).
"1 See Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858, 866-70 (Cal. 1977)
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
IS Multiplicity of suits and likelihood of double recovery have been cited by
the courts as among the major reasons for denying the action. A number of juris-
dictions have conditioned recognition of the action "on a requirement that the
child's claims be joined with his injured parent's claim. If a child's consortium
claim is brought separately, the burden will be on the plaintiff to show why join-
der was not feasible." Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259, 270 (Iowa 1981), overruled
by Audubon-Exira Ready Mix, Inc. v. Illinois Cent. G.R.R., 335 N.W.2d 148 (Iowa
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plicity of suits, diminishes administrative concerns and also
lessens the likelihood of duplicitous recoveries. In essence, a
joinder rule assures that all the claims and parties, those of
children included, are before the court in the same instance.
This provides courts with an opportunity to examine each ele-
ment of damage and utilize pre-trial procedure to dispose of
untenable claims. Joinder also provides courts with an opportu-
nity to determine eligibility and to equitably apportion the
damages award among the children.
114
Every jurisdiction has specific periods of limitation within
which every civil action must be brought or otherwise forfeited.
One rationale for statutes of limitation is that it is fundamen-
tally unfair and prejudicial to the defendant if the plaintiff is
allowed an infinite period within which to seek legal recourse
for interference with a protected interest. It is uniformly
agreed, however, that fairness must also be shown to the
plaintiff operating under a disability at the time of the inva-
sion. Consequently, periods of limitation are ordinarily tolled
for certain legislatively prescribed reasons.
The disability of minority is one of the more common rea-
sons for tolling the operation of statutes of limitation. Mandato-
ry joinder eliminates multiple lawsuits by removing parental
consortium claims from the ambit of ordinary tolling statutes.
Were this not the case, siblings could decide to forego litigation
of their claims until the disability is removed from each child,
respectively. Thus, due to the different ages and number of
children, the defendant is put in the unfair position of having
to bear the expense of multiple suits over an indefinite period
of time.
1983); see also Hay v. Medical Ctr. Hosp., 496 A.2d 939, 943-44 (Vt. 1985);
Ueland v. Reynolds Metals Co., 691 P.2d 190, 194-95 (Wash. 1984); Belcher v.
Goins, 400 S.E.2d 830, 838-39 (W. Va. 1990); Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell County
Joint Powers Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171, 1175-76 (Wyo. 1990).
114 All agree that there must be some limits on tort recovery. Parental con-
sortium is not an exception to this rule. The decision where the limitation exists
is essentially political. But in the context of loss of parental consortium it re-
volves around such considerations as age, maturity, and physical and mental dis-
abilities.
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One alternative to mandatory joinder is to allow the defen-
dant to require joinder. This view, followed in only one jurisdic-
tion currently recognizing loss of parental consortium, is mere-
ly a modification of the mandatory joinder rule."' The ratio-
nale for this view is that because minority ordinarily tolls the
statute of limitations, it is unfair to the defendant to allow
claimants to wait until after their eighteenth birthday to bring
their consortium claims. " 6 This rationale is identical to that
which underlies the mandatory joinder rule. The strict rule re-
quiring joinder unless infeasible, however, negates placing this
burden on the defendant who may inadvertently fail to exercise
it. Under mandatory joinder, the plaintiff bears the burden of
proving the infeasibility of joinder. " 7 Additionally, mandatory
joinder also encourages settlement.
Joinder also lessens the likelihood that the defendant will
pay twice for the same element of damages. For example, an
injured parent and non-injured spouse bring an action against
a tortfeasor and recover for loss of earnings. Counsel for the
child of the injured parent subsequently seeks compensation for
the child's loss of "support and maintenance, care, society,
affection and kindness." Arguably, the claim for parental "sup-
port and maintenance" gives rise to the objection that compen-
sation of such loss would cause the defendant to pay twice for
the same element of damage. " The claim for "support and
maintenance" should be severed from the child's action while
the claims for loss of care, society, affection and kindness
' See Villareal v. Arizona Dep't of Transp., 774 P.2d 213, 220 (Ariz. 1989).
16 Villareal, 774 P.2d at 220.
". See, e.g., Weiti, 311 N.W.2d at 270; WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS (CIVIL) 32.05 cmt. (3d ed. 1989).
"s Lawyers should exercise great care in drafting parental consortium claims.
As illustrated in the text, the claim for lost earnings by the parents and lost sup-
port and maintenance by the child are identical. Given the novelty of parental
consortium, it is probably better to assert claims which are clearly unrelated to
claims already asserted by either parent. For example, the objections raised by
the defendant alleging double payment could be avoided by merely seeking recov-
ery of damages for loss of care, affection and kindness. See, e.g., Pleasant v.
Washington Sand & Gravel Co., 262 F.2d 471, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Russell v.
Salem Transp. Co., 295 A.2d 862, 864 (N.J. 1972).
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should be allowed to continue to the jury.11 Thus, mandatory
joinder gives the court an opportunity to scrutinize each aspect
of the child's claim against those of the injured parent.
2. Damages Recoverable
Pecuniary damages, such as lost income, which are likely
to be used for the benefit of the child are recoverable in the
parent's action but not in the child's claim.12 As observed by
Justice Kauger, writing for the court, in Williams v. Hook:2'
The entire sum which would have been available as a re-
source for the parent to provide support and benefits to the
child, be they essential or recreational, is recovered by the
parent. A cause of action for loss of parental consortium is
limited primarily to an award based on the emotional suffer-
ing of the child, and recovery is limited to loss of the parent's
society and companionship.'22
Economic losses are not recoverable in a loss of parental
consortium action under circumstances where a parent is negli-
gently injured rather than killed."2 This rule precludes the
child from recovering for the "value of nursing, domestic or
household services provided by the minor child to the injured
parent."1"4 The value of services, other than those of the par-
ent to the child,"2 like economic losses, are recoverable by the
119 See supra note 118.
12 See Hibpshman v. Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991, 997 (Alaska
1987); Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 467 (Tex. 1990); Belcher v. Gains, 400
S.E.2d 830, 843 (W. Va. 1990); Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344 N.W.2d 513, 521
(Wis. 1984).
121 804 P.2d 1131 (Okla. 1990).
' Williams, 804 P.2d at 1135.
'z Id. In Williams, the issue of whether economic losses can ever be recovered
in a parental consortium claim was expressly reserved by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court. Id. at 1135 n.13.
See Belcher, 400 S.E.2d at 843.
Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259, 269 (Iowa 1981), overruled by Audubon-
Exira Ready Mix, Inc. v. Illinois Cent. G.R.R., 355 N.W.2d 148 (Iowa 1983). The
value of the parent's services to the child are economic in nature. Weitl, 311
N.W.2d at 269. However, because this element of damages is not recoverable in
the parent's action, it is allowed in the child's. Id.; see, e.g., MICHIGAN STANDARD
[Vol. 64
PARENTAL CONSORTIUM
injured parent. A rule to the contrary would certainly lead to
the defendant paying double compensation for the same inju-
ry126 Factors which should be considered in assessing damag-
es include the severity of the injury to the parent and its actual
effect upon the parent-child relationship, the child's age, the
nature of the child's relationship with the parent, the child's
emotional and physical characteristics and whether other con-
sortium providing relationships are available to the child.'27
The measure of damages in a loss of parental consortium
claim is also affected by the standing rule followed in a particu-
lar jurisdiction. Where standing is limited to minor children
and injury of a permanent nature occurs, the measure of dam-
ages is limited to the number of years remaining until majori-
ty. This limitation is inapplicable where standing is not limited
to minority. Where such is the case, damages for permanent
consortium loss are based on the shorter of the injured parent's
or child's life expectancies."2
JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CML 52.02 (2d ed. 1990). The Michigan instruction provides
in pertinent part:
In this case [plaintiff] is claiming that [he/she] sustained damages as a
result of injury to [his/her] [father/mother]. If you find that [plaintiff]
[is/would be] entitled to damages, then it is your duty to determine the
amount of money which will reasonably, fairly and adequately compen-
sate [plaintiff] for any of the following elements of damage [he/she] has
sustained to the present time as a result of injury to [his/her] [fa-
ther/mother].
a. the reasonable value of the services of [his/her] [father/mother] of
which [he/she] has been deprived.
Id. Regarding determination of a damage award, Prosser explains that "[dlifficult
problems remain, however. Since the injured husband (for example) is entitled to
recover for his own diminished earning capacity, the wife's consortium claim for
loss of services must not be allowed to include lost services that are also part of
that diminished capacity." KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 125, at 933.
126 But cf Villareal v. Arizona Dep't of Transp., 775 P.2d 213, 220 (Ariz. 1989)
(including "support" among elements of damages for which child can recover);
Williams, 804 P.2d at 1135 n.13 (declining to address issue of whether economic
loss is ever recoverable in parental consortium action).
See Villareal, 774 P.2d at 220-21; Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 467
(Tex. 1990); Belcher, 400 S.E.2d at 842.
28 See Audubon-Exira Ready Mix, Inc. v. Illinois Cent. G.R.R., 335 N.W.2d
148, 152 (Iowa 1983).
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Parental consortium also seeks to protect the child's inter-
est in mental and psychological well being. Accordingly, damag-
es for emotional distress are recoverable separate and apart
from an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.1"
3. Jury Instructions
There are four basic models for drafting parental consor-
tium instructions. The first model consists of one very broad
instruction which merely mentions certain aspects of the ac-
tion. Illustrative of this model is Alaska's model instruction
which provides:
The (first, second, etc.) item of non-economic loss is
claimed not by (name of principal plaintiffls)) but by
(his/her/their) (child/children). The child(ren) claim(s) that an
injury to the (name of principal plaintiff) legally caused by
the defendant(s) has damaged the relationship between par-
ent and child.
You may make an award for the fair value of the loss of
the enjoyment, care, guidance, love and protection that the
child(ren) have suffered or are reasonably probable to suffer
in the future. In deciding whether such a loss has occurred
and the amount of any award, you may consider, among other
things, evidence relating to the nature of the relationship
between parent(s) and child(ren).
If you decide to make an award to the child(ren) for this
claimed loss, your award must not include any amount that
duplicates any award to (name of principal plaintiff). For
example, you should not make an award to the child(ren) for
any loss of financial support from their parent, because that
amount would already be included in the parent's right to
recover for loss of earnings or loss of (his/her) ability to earn
money. 130
This instruction does not attempt to define for the jury the
interests that parental consortium protects. Neither does it
' See, e.g., Villareal, 774 P.2d at 220; Williams, 804 P.2d at 1135; Hays v.
Medical Ctr. Hosp., 496 A.2d 939, 942 (Vt. 1985).
130 ALASKA CMvL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 20.09 (1990).
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articulate a prima facie case upon which the damages award is
based. This model in all likelihood will lead to jury confusion
and questionable awards due to the absence of a prima facie
requirement and basic articulation of the interests protected by
parental consortium.
The second model consists of several instructions. The first
instruction defines parental consortium and/or sets out the
prima facie case. Thereafter, a separate instruction detailing
the measure of damages and the effect of the injured parent's
comparative negligence is given. Oklahoma's parental consor-
tium instructions are excellent examples of this model. That
instruction provides:
[Plaintiff] has sued [Defendant] for loss of parental consor-
tium as a result of the injury to [Parent]. Parental consortium
is defined as the love, care, companionship, and guidance
given by a parent to a minor child. For [Plaintiff] to recover
on this claim you must find all the following:
A. [Parent] is entitled to recover damages from [Defendant]
for [his/her] injuries.
B. [Parent]'s injury is permanent.
C. [Plaintiff] was a minor [or incapacitated dependent] child
of [Parent] at the time [Parent] sustained the injuries.
D. As a result of the injuries sustained by [Parent], [Plaintiff]
sustained a loss of parental consortium. 3'
The measure of damages instruction provides:
If you decide for [Plaintiff] on the question of liability,
you must then determine the amount of money which will
reasonably and fairly compensate [him/her] for the value of
the parental consortium [he/she] has lost, and for the value of
the loss of parental consortium [he/she] is reasonably certain
to sustain until [he/she] reaches the age of eighteen.
You are instructed that if you use the White Verdict
Form, you should determine the full value of the loss of con-
sortium. Whatever dollar amount you determine will be re-
'a' OKLAHOMA UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) 4.7 (2d ed. 1993); cf.
MICHIGAN STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIvIL 52.02 (2d ed. 1990) (consisting of
only one instruction on measure of damages).
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duced by the Court by that percentage of negligence which
you have attached to [Parent].'
This model suffers no major shortcomings. It is informative and
avoids prolixity. Thus, this model enhances the likelihood that
the jury will understand the rules for carrying out its responsi-
bilities.
The third model, utilized in Texas, consists of a combina-
tion of instructions. The first instruction defines the concept of
parental consortium. Thereafter, the jury is given a series of
questions. Each question must be answered in the affirmative
in order to reach the issue of damages. The Texas instructions
provide:
If you have answered Question(s)[questions establishing
liability of one or more defendants] "Yes," then answer the
following Question. Otherwise, do not answer the following
question.
QUESTION
Was the physical injury to [Plaintiff] a serious, perma-
nent, and disabling injury?
Answer "Yes" or "No"
Answer:' 33
If you answered Question [7.10] "Yes," then answer the
following question. Otherwise, do not answer the following
question.
QUESTION
What sum of money, if paid now in cash, would fairly
and reasonably compensate [Plaintiff] for the loss, if any, of
parental consortium that resulted from the physical injury to
[Parent].
"Parental consortium" means the positive benefits flow-
ing from the parent's love, affection, protection, emotion-
al support, services, companionship, care and society.
In considering your answer to this question, you may
consider only the following factors: the severity of the injury
to parent and its actual effect on the parent-child relation-
'2 OKLAHOMA UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) 4.8 (2d ed. 1993).
'13 TExAs PATTERN JURY CHARGES 7.10 (1987).
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ship, the child's age, the nature of the child's relationship
with the parent, the child's emotional and physical charac-
teristics, and whether other consortium-giving relationships
are available to the child.
Do not include interest on any amount of damages you
find. Do not reduce the amounts, if any, in your answer be-
cause of the negligence, if any, of [Parent].'"
This model is simplistic and avoids confusion through its step
by step approach to parental consortium. It avoids the use of
spousal consortium instructions and requires that the jury
determine the merits of the case before addressing damages.
A fourth, and not very popular, model merely contemplates
the insertion of a parental consortium measure of damages
statement into general personal injury instructions.'35 This
model provides the jury with little, if any, actual information
about the underlying cause of action.
Well drafted jury instructions are important in parental
consortium actions, especially if double recoveries and excessive
or inadequate verdicts are to be prevented. Much of the lan-
guage used in parental consortium jury instructions is purely
discretionary. However, the court should instruct the jury that
the child's damages for parental consortium are separate and
distinct from the parent's recovery, and that any award will
"accrue directly to the child rather than be lumped in with that
of the parent who may or may not spend it for the child's
benefit. " "3
Carefully drafted instructions should also inform the jury
of the nature of the action for parental consortium. This can be
achieved either by defining the concept for the jury and/or by
setting out a specific prima facie case which the plaintiff must
satisfy in order to recover. The jury should also be instructed
4 Id. 7.11B.
" See WASHINGTON PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) 32.05 (3d ed. 1989).
1 Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424, 427 (Mich. 1981); see Hibpshman v.
Prudhoe Bay Supply, Inc., 734 P.2d 991, 996 (Alaska 1987); Ueland v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 691 P.2d 190, 195 (Wash. 1984); Theama v. City of Kenosha, 344
N.W.2d 513, 516 (Wis. 1984).
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on the factors that can be considered in assessing damages."3 7
Likewise, an instruction prohibiting double recoveries and
outlining the specific elements of damages would lessen the
probability of confusion and excessive or inadequate damages.
4. Sentimental vs. Material Damages
At early common law, consortium protected only the right
that husbands had to the services of their injured wives."s
Consequently, early common law courts interpreted consortium
to include only the material, economic or tangible aspects of the
marital relationship. Consortium, therefore, did not protect
non-pecuniary interests.
Contemporary courts, unlike their early counterparts, de-
fine consortium quite broadly to include all aspects of the
spousal relationship. Consequently, awards for spousal consor-
tium have been expanded to compensate for impairment of not
only material losses, but also sentimental ones. Material losses
correspond to economically quantifiable, tangible, pecuniary
losses, while sentimental aspects refer to intangible, non-pecu-
niary, non-economic losses not suitable for market valua-
tion." 9 The terms "society, companionship, affection, love, and
care" all reflect the non-quantifiable sentimental elements of
consortium. The term "services" typifies the material, economi-
cally quantifiable element of consortium.
The distinctions between the concepts of material and
sentimental losses has in the law of spousal consortium become
blurred. Regardless of how the various jurisdictions character-
ize consortium, therefore, all courts evaluate the same factors
as proof of loss of consortium. 4 °
Courts recognizing loss of parental consortium claims have
characterized the action, in varying degrees, as the right of
children to the love, care, society, guidance, services and com-
' See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
'3s See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
'" Ridgeway, supra note 3, at 350.
14 ld. at 351.
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panionship of the injured parent."' Arguably, the inclusion of
the word "services" in the characterization of parental consor-
tium suggests that children, as well as the injured parent, may
recover for material and sentimental losses. This, however, is
not the case. The sentimental/material dichotomy is alive and
well in the law of loss of parental consortium. This action is
intended to protect only the child's sentimental, non-pecuniary
interests in the filial relationship. Thus, the general rule is
that all material, pecuniary losses, such as those for services,
can be recovered only by the injured parent in a direct action
against the tortfeasor. The sentimental/material dichotomy in
parental consortium further prevents double recovery. Logic
dictates that once the injured parent is compensated and made
whole, the primary obligation to financially care for the child
shifts back to the parent.
Problems, however, do remain. Since the injured parent is
entitled to recover for his own diminished earning capacity, the
child's consortium claim cannot be allowed to include lost ser-
vices that are also part of the diminished capacity of the par-
ent. In Michigan, where the term "services" is expressly used to
characterize damages in loss of parental consortium claims,""
a different rule has developed. This rule provides that damages
for loss of the parent's services cannot be recovered by both the
injured parent and child. Though it is possible for the child to
recover for loss of the injured parent's services, no significant
breach of the general rule results because either the parent or
the child, but not both, may recover. This rule, like the abso-
lute prohibition against a child recovering for loss of services,
achieves the same end as that achieved by the sentimen-
tal/material dichotomy.
Texas, like Michigan, uses the term "services" to character-
ize damages recoverable in a parental consortium action.'
Texas, however, treats the term "services" as a non-pecuniary
"' See supra note 34.
W See Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424, 425 (Mich. 1981); see also MICHIGAN
STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL 52.02 (2d ed. 1990).
"' See Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 467 (Tex. 1990).
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loss.'" A similar view is followed in Iowa, which defines con-
sortium to include the present value of the "services" which
would have been rendered by a parent to the child.14 Howev-
er, Iowa further provides that loss of financial support is not
included in the damages recoverable in a parental consortium
action."M
D. The Prima Facie Case
The prima facie case requirement for parental consortium
depends upon how courts respond to three substantive issues:
standing (minor/adult child); the nature or quality of the injury
required (temporary/permanent); and how the jurisdiction in
question views consortium claims (derivative/independent).
Ordinarily the plaintiff must prove: (1) he or she has standing
to sue; (2) an injury of the quality required under the law of his
jurisdiction has occurred; (3) the filial relationship; and (4)
actual harm to the filial relationship and plaintiff.
Jurisdictions which limit standing to minor children, re-
quire permanent injury and view consortium claims as deriv-
ative. The plaintiff must show that: (1) parent has suffered a
compensable injury; (2) the injury is permanent; (3) plaintiff
was a minor at the time of the injury; and (4) as a result of the
injury to the parent, the plaintiff has suffered a loss of parental
consortium. The measure of damages where standing is limited
to minor children may not exceed the number of years remain-
ing until plaintiff reaches majority age. The court presumes
damage to the filial relationship once the plaintiff has shown
that the parent's injury was permanent in nature. However,
the plaintiff must still put on evidence of the relationship be-
fore and after the injury. This evidence will influence the
amount of damages awarded.
In a jurisdiction such as Iowa, which does not limit stand-
ing to minor children or view consortium as derivative, the
14 Reagan, 804 S.W.2d at 467.
Audubon-Exira Ready Mix, Inc. v. Illinois Cent. G.R.R., 335 N.W.2d 148,
152 (Iowa 1983).
'" See IOWA CML JURY INSTRUCTIONS 200.20 (1991).
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prima facie requirement consists of evidence that: (1) the par-
ent has suffered an injury; (2) the injury is permanent; and (3)
as a result of the injury to the parent, the plaintiff has suffered
a loss of parental consortium. The proof required to satisfy this
prima facie case differs greatly from the prima facie case set
out above only where the plaintiff is an adult child. In order to
recover substantial damages, an adult child must put on evi-
dence of a strong filial relationship. This evidence must demon-
strate that the adult child continues to look to the injured par-
ent for substantial economic, emotional and psychological sup-
port. A presumption of injury to the filial relationship does not
arise in favor of non-dependent adult children. Likewise, where
adult children are allowed to recover for loss of parental consor-
tium, the trier of fact determines the damages for permanent
injury based on the shorter of the injured parent's or child's life
expectancies.
Another prima facie case scenario is followed in jurisdic-
tions which do not treat consortium as derivative or require
permanent injury. In such jurisdictions the evidence must show
that: (1) the parent has suffered an injury; and (2) as a result
of the injury to the parent, the plaintiff has suffered a loss of
parental consortium.
The chart below illustrates how jurisdictions that currently
recognize the action have responded to the issues of standing
(minor/adult child); the nature or quality of the injury required
(temporary/permanent); and how consortium claims (deriva-
tive/independent) should be viewed.
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E. An Ending But Not A Conclusion
Continued efforts to expand the concept of consortium are
inevitable. 47 This is due, in part, to the difficulty courts have
experienced in articulating a precise definition of the concept.
Inherently nebulous, the concept of consortium was originally
used to describe the husband's action for the loss of his wife's
services. The concept was subsequently expanded to protect the
husband's interest in his wife's services, as well as her compan-
ionship, love, society and sexual relationship.
Thereafter, consortium was further broadened beyond its
common law definition to include the right of the wife to the
benefits of the marital relationship. Since then, consortium has
taken on a descriptive, rather than definitive meaning. Gener-
ally, consortium has been used to describe such elements of
damages as companionship, love, solace, affection and services.
It has simultaneously been used to connote a substantive cause
of action. Many courts, however, still cling to the archaic notion
that consortium protects only the conjugal fellowship of spous-
es. These same courts, however, recognize that other non-
spousal filial relationships are entitled to legal protection. The
legal profession, in response, has identified the law of consor-
tium as the proper avenue to an otherwise accepted end. The
legal protection accorded the parent-child relationship is analo-
gous to a two way street. Along one street runs the child's
interest in the love, affection and care of an injured parent.
Along the other travels the corresponding interests of parents
in the love, affection and attention of an injured child. While
more jurisdictions have recognized the right of a child to recov-
er for negligent injury to a parent, a strong contingent of juris-
dictions have undertaken to protect the consortium interest of
147 See generally Catherine O'Brien, Some Lawyers Argue that Twins Need
Legal Rights, TULSA WORLD NEWSP., Dec. 28, 1993, at 13. Lawyers in California
have filed several law suits in which they contend that twins' experiences bind
them so closely together that they also share a special legal status. Death or dis-
figurement of one destroys the twins' bond entitling them to special compensation.
Id.
19941
MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL
parents in nonfatally injured children."
The kinship between the two actions is more than histori-
cal and theoretical. This fact is demonstrated by the case of
United States v. Dempsey.49 In Dempsey, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals submitted on certification to the Supreme
Court of Florida the question whether Florida law permits par-
ents to recover for the loss of a child's companionship and soci-
ety."0 The court observed that Florida law had for some time
recognized the parent's right to recover for such losses. 5'
Nevertheless, the court went on to emphatically state that
"even if this court previously had not expanded the common
law to allow recovery for the loss of a negligently injured child's
companionship, we would do so now. ""' The Dempsey court
found additional support for its conclusion in section 768.0145
of the Florida Statutes which created the right of children to
recover loss of consortium damages for permanent injury to a
parent."S Considered together, the statute, constitution and
case law manifested a strong pronouncement that familial
relationships should be protected and that recovery be had for
wrongful injuries adversely affecting those relationships."5
Recognizing the substantive similarities between the parents'
claim and that of children, the court concluded that recovery
for loss of filial consortium should be limited in the same man-
ner. 1
55
The arguments for and against protection of the parent's
consortium interest in instances where a child is negligently
but nonfatally injured are identical to those articulated in pa-
rental consortium.5 These filial relationships differ from the
spousal relationship only with regards to the sexual aspect of
14 For a list of the jurisdictions protecting the parents' consortium interest,
see supra note 24.
635 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1994).
15 Dempsey, 635 So. 2d at 962.
SId. at 963.
152 Id. at 964.
1"3 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 786.0145 (West Supp. 1994).
'" Dempsey, 635 So. 2d. at 964-65.
15 Id.
'5 Johnson, supra note 23, at 762-64.
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the latter. The major policy concern, much like that in parental
consortium, is not whether the filial relationship is entitled to
legal protection, but rather whether consortium, which histori-
cally was only concerned with the conjugal relationship, is the
proper means for achieving this end. Consequently, some courts
that protect the interest of parents no longer employ the term
consortium to describe the legal protection accorded."5 7
Neither the use or disuse of the concept of consortium
resolves the issue of whether consortium should be expanded to
protect other non-spousal filial relationships. Nor does resolu-
tion of the issue require the creation of a new cause of action.
Compensating parents and children for loss of the other's soci-
ety and companionship merely requires a redefining of the
protected aspects of the family relationship. The judicial recep-
tion that filial protection has received over the past fourteen
years suggests that courts should refrain from engaging in
euphemistic logomachy. Rather, compensating parents and
children for the loss of the other's society "represents a shift in
our cultural expression of the importance of various aspects of
the filial relationship and the degree of protection each de-
serves."'5
In 1976, Professor Jean Love began what eventually would
become a universal call for the protection of the parent-child
and child-parent relationships.159 Less than four years later,
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts adopted the logic and
appeal of Professor Love's work and became the first jurisdic-
tion to recognize an action for parental consortium. 60 In the
fourteen years since the Massachusetts decision, this logic and
appeal has swiftly spread across the country. As such, contem-
"' See, e.g., Norvell v. Cuyahoga County Hosp., 463 N.E.2d 111, 114 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1983) (concluding that parents may recover for loss of child's society, servic-
es, companionship, comfort, love and solace); Shockley v. Prier, 225 N.W.2d 495,
501 (Wis. 1975) (stating that parent may recover for loss of child's aid, comfort,
society and companionship); cf. Frank v. Superior Ct. of Ariz., 722 P.2d 955, 961
(Ariz. 1986) (retaining concept of consortium).
i Johnson, supra note 23, at 778.
"' See Love, supra note 31, at 594-95.
"6 See Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690, 703 (Mass.
1980).
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porary courts can no longer turn a blind eye to the subject of
filial rights.
What remains is the test of trial and error against which
all common law rights are meted. These tests, and how well
filial protection fairs, will be the subject of future scholarly
works. However, it is hoped that the discussions and observa-
tions contained herein will help direct and influence the future
development of the law in this area.
